Sawing Off the Branch They're Sitting On: A Witness Objection to Exhaustive Foreknowledge

Jehovah’s Witnesses argue that if God possesses exhaustive foreknowledge he would be evil and a failure for his permission of the Fall. This position can be refuted head on, though it is not the purpose of this essay to present such a rebuttal. Rather, its aim is to demonstrate that in making this sort of argument Witnesses end up convicting God even as he is misunderstood in their own theology. Since Witnesses acknowledge that God is perfect, they ought to abandon their misguided criticism of the orthodox affirmation of exhaustive foreknowledge and meticulous providence. The argument of this essay succeeds because the Witness open theist view is sufficiently akin to the orthodox affirmation of exhaustive foreknowledge and meticulous providence. Therefore, many of the criticisms of the latter, including those made by Witnesses, are implicitly criticisms of the former.

While exhaustive foreknowledge is the target against which Witness polemics are directed, we will focus on one of the most important events that God foreknew, the Fall. Witnesses object that if God foreknew “Adam’s fall into sin . . . he would have become the author of sin when he made man, and God would be deliberately responsible for all human wickedness and suffering.” (April 15, 1998 Watchtower, pp. 7-8) Other publications make the same claim.[1] (E.g., Reasoning From the Scriptures, p. 142; June 1, 2006 Watchtower, p. 25) Another article in the January 1, 2011 Watchtower characterizes the orthodox view of the Fall as follows. “He [would have been] foolish . . . to embark on a bizarre venture, using his ability to know the outcome in advance and then staging a mere rerun of what he already knew.” (p. 13)

If Witnesses were run of the mill open theists, they might be left with a self-coherent (if otherwise defective) objection. However, since Witnesses believe that God has sometimes used his power of foreknowledge, they are at risk of finding themselves the targets of their own objection. A brief discussion of their view of the extent of God’s foreknowledge will reveal whether they do fall by their own polemical sword. Sometimes what God is said to know is general in nature. For instance, they claim that when it was originally predicted that one of the Twelve would betray Jesus, God did not specifically foreknow that Judas would be that one. (June 1, 1953 Watchtower, p. 339; July 15, 1984 Watchtower, p. 6) But that God has foreknown even rather specific things is also taught within Witness literature. The prophecies of Christ with respect to Peter and John’s deaths, for instance. (July 15, 1948 Watchtower, pp. 223) Josiah’s campaign against idolatry at Bethel. And Cyrus’ conquest of Babylon. (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. I, p. 856) Draw Close to Jehovah states that “the outcome of wars, the rise and fall of world powers, and even the specific battles strategies of military commanders” are among the things God foreknew. (pp. 177-178) Witnesses also believe that the foreordination of the Messiah is the preeminent example of God’s foreknowledge and providence in action. This includes the fact of his death, its manner, and time. (Ibid. pp. 858-859)

Let us focus on the sins against Christ that God foreknew and utilized. Since Witnesses claim that God foreknew and used these to bring about his own good purpose, how can they avoid the apparent implication of their own logic that God failed and must be culpable for these crimes?

Might a Witness take refuge in the fact that unlike the orthodox they do not claim that God foreknew all of the details of these crimes? As was noted above, in Witness theology God permitted his foreknowledge about Jesus’ betrayer to be somewhat vague. That it proved to be Judas was not yet known to God when these prophecies were first written. In those days, God only knew that he would be one of Jesus’ inner circle. They say the same thing with respect to the role of Pilate or Herod, also. “Without predestining the specific individuals to act against him when on earth, the prophecies did predict many of the events that occurred,” states one Watchtower article. (June 1, 1953 Watchtower, p. 339) Does this sort of (at least initial) vagueness to God’s foreknowledge absolve God of the charge of complicity in such crimes? 

No. The fundamental fact remains that even within Witness theology God still foreknew the sins themselves, even if his knowledge as to who would commit the sins only became more specific as time progressed. Moreover, even Witness literature concedes that such sins were “a vital part of the outworking of Jehovah’s purpose.” (October 1, 1974 Watchtower, p. 598) And, as even Witnesses would concede, God could have prevented any sins against Christ from taking place. They explicitly state that he was able to “thwart or even block any attacks or attempts upon the Messiah that did not conform to the manner or time prophesied.” (August 1, 1970 Watchtower, p. 476; Insight on the Scriptures Vol. I, p. 858) And the actual occurrence of the predicted crimes depended “in part upon God’s own exercise of power.” (Ibid.) And, they teach that such crimes would occur was inevitable, at least once God came to foreknew them. (Ibid., p. 852)

If God can infallibly foreknow certain sins and utilize them for his own good purpose while remaining neither evil nor a failure, why would this not hold with respect to the Fall? Or, if it would be immoral for God to foreknow the Fall how can he remain moral since he both foreknew and intended to utilize the sins against Christ? However the problem is articulated, we believe that Witness theology does not have a good solution to this difficulty. And while this by itself does not mean that the Witness view of the extent of God’s foreknowledge or providence is wrong, it does mean that one of their objections against the orthodox affirmation of its universal scope is untenable for a Witness to make. And this, we believe, is an important step in defending sound doctrine against its Witness critics.

[1] Interestingly, however, Russell, whose Bible Student movement gave rise to Jehovah’s Witnesses and some other groups, taught that God did foreknow the Fall. (Studies in the Scriptures Vol. I, p. 193)

An Argument That The Witness Doctrine of Foreknowledge is Contradictory

P1) “Whatever God foreknows must inevitably come to pass.” (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. I, p. 852)

P2) “Jehovah God foreknew and foretold the Messiah’s sufferings, the death he would undergo, and his subsequent resurrection.” (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. I, p. 858)

C) Therefore, Christ (faithful) death and (glorious) resurrection was ‘inevitable’.

P3) Christ was “still a free moral agent” who had “freedom of choice – either to be faithful or unfaithful.” (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. II, pp. 67-68)

C2) Therefore, (according to Witness theology) infallible foreknowledge does not negate free will.

P4) There is no good reason why this should only hold true with respect to merely a few persons, actions, or events.

C3) Therefore, Witness theology should concede that exhaustive foreknowledge does not obviate “freedom of choice.”

P5) Witness theology denies that exhaustive foreknowledge is compatible with "freedom of choice."

C4) Witness theology is contradictory.

12.19.2024: I think a Witness will argue that C2) should be qualified in the following manner: infallible foreknowledge does not necessarily negate free will. Likewise, I think that a Witness would deny P4), at least if these persons, actions, or events are foreknown by God via a certain method.

Omnipresence in Witness Theology: A Contradiction

The claim of this essay is that the Witness doctrine of God contains the following contradiction. While explicitly denying that God can be omnipresent, Witness literature implicitly concedes that he is or could be omnipresent by other claims that they make with respect to the holy spirit. Therefore, they undermine their own claim that for God to be personal he cannot be omnipresent but must rather be essentially bodily.[1] We believe the presence of this contradiction within the Witness doctrine of God has the following implications. First, it weakens the doctrinal authority of Witness leaders, who cannot even harmonize their account of God's attributes. Second, it undermines Witness opposition to the orthodox claim that God is omnipresent. Third, it weakens their opposition to the personhood of the Holy Spirit.

According to Witness theology, what is the holy spirit? Their literature describes the spirit as "an instrumentality rather than a separate and distinct person." (July 15, 1957 Watchtower, p. 432) Their literature teaches that it basically is God's power. For, while Witness theology distinguishes God's spirit from his power, we would suggest that no real distinction is actually made between them. Rather, God's spirit is merely his power considered under a particular description, namely, that of being used. Put another way, we believe that the distinction made within Witness literature is between the thing itself and the thing considered under a particular description.

Their theological dictionary, Insight on the Scriptures, states the following with respect to the holy spirit. "It is not Jehovah’s 'power,' for this English word more correctly translates other terms in the original languages." (Vol. I, p. 1020) Yet this same article claims that there is "an inherent connection between" God's power and his spirit. This connection is indicated in how this article defines the two terms. "Power," it says, "is basically the ability or capacity to act." Spirit, on the other hand, "more specifically describes energy projected and exerted." Or in the words of an older Witness publication the spirit is "not Jehovah's power residing within himself but his energy when projected out from himself." (July 15, 1957 Watchtower, pp. 432) In our opinion Witness theology calls it power when God does not use it and spirit when he uses it. We believe that this view is also supported by a more recent Witness periodical referring to the holy spirit as God's "power in action." (February 1, 2009 Watchtower, p. 5)

Since Witness theology holds that the spirit is basically God's power it is evident that Witness theology regards it as intrinsic to God's being.[2] Given that Witnesses affirm metaphysical composition in God, Witness theology should have no qualms with affirming that the spirit is literally a part of God.

While some of their analogies for the spirit, such as comparing it to the electricity that comes from a power plant, might suggest that they conceive of it as extrinsic to God – that is, not part of God but rather a created force – we believe that drawing this inference is to take these analogies too far. (February 15, 1981 Watchtower, p. 6) Besides the reason given above, two further considerations support the conclusion that within Witness theology the spirit is conceived of as part of God.[3] First, other analogies indicate this. For instance, one Witness publication compares the spirit to a father's loving hand. (February 1, 2009 Watchtower, p. 5) Second, certain absurdities follow from supposing that the spirit is extrinsic to God, that is, not a part of him. According to Watchtower literature, the spirit is how God creates, gives life, inspires prophets, judges and the like. Supposing that his spirit is a creature seems to amount to saying that God is dependent upon a creature to do these things, which is absurd. And if God would be dependent upon a creature to do these things, it would be inexplicable as to how he would interact with this said creature in the first place. For if he requires the mediation of a creature to create or interact with the created world, how could he interact with a creaturely holy spirit in the first place? Clearly, therefore, Witness theology both does and must regard the spirit as part of God or as intrinsic to his being.

And this is where the problem arises. Witnesses claim that God cannot be omnipresent since he is personal. (Millennial Dawn Vol. I, p. 200; The Bible Students Monthly (1915) Vol. VII, No. 5, p. 2; October 1, 1951 Watchtower, p. 607; February 15, 1981 Watchtower, p. 6; March 8, 2005 Awake!, pp. 20-21; Bible Questions Answered, No. 123) Why they make this false and tendentious assertion is besides the scope of this essay. That they make this claim is relevant, though. Because they implicitly contradict this claim by conceiving of the spirit as part of God. If the spirit is part of God, then God must be present wherever the spirit is present.

Where is the spirit present according to Witness theology? Everywhere, at least potentially so. And for the purpose of this essay claiming that the spirit is potentially ubiquitous is just as problematic for Witness theology as claiming that it is actually ubiquitous. For the claim that Witnesses make is not that God merely is not omnipresent but that God cannot be personal if he is omnipresent. Even if their theology only leads them to conclude that he merely can be omnipresent, this would still be a contradiction. The following quotations show that according to their literature, Witnesses believe that the spirit is at least capable of being omnipresent. “His holy spirit as an active force is pervading all the unseen heavens.” (Holy Spirit—The Force Behind the Coming New Order!, p. 32) "God's spirit can reach everywhere." (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. II, p. 1017?) "Jehovah's holy spirit – or power in action – can be extended from his fixed location to any place in the material universe." (p. 21)

Our argument is straightforward. Witness theology affirms that the holy spirit is part of God. His holy spirit is or can be omnipresent. Therefore, Witness theology implicitly affirms that God is or can be omnipresent. However, they explicitly deny that he can be; they claim that he could not be personal if he was omnipresent. So there is a contradiction within Witness theology.

How might a Witness defend against this claim? We believe that there are three ways. First, one might argue that the Spirit is not actually part of God. Second, one might deny that the Spirit is ever literally present anywhere. Third, one might claim that God can be present everywhere just not in person or bodily. We believe that our earlier arguments suffice for now to show that the first option is not a viable candidate for a response. The second does not fare any better. Their literature clearly speaks of the spirit pervading heaven, being able to reach anywhere within the physical world, interacting with creation and the like. The sort of language used and the sort of claims made about the holy spirit should lead a Witness to dismiss the idea that according to their theology the spirit is not truly present where it operates.

Therefore, we believe that the third option is the only possible way out. Though, this appearance is fleeting, too. This response does have the benefit of apparently being suggested by some statements within Witness literature. For instance, one publication claims that “heaven itself” is “where the ‘person of God’ is, where God himself dwells personally rather than dwelling there by spirit.” (December 1, 1972 Watchtower, p. 713) And the idea of a genuine spiritual (as opposed to personal) presence is affirmed in an article in Insight on the Scriptures. There it is claimed that certain biblical “accounts illustrate God’s power to ‘be present’ on earth in a spiritual (hence, invisible) way while He yet remains in heaven.” (Vol. II, p. 677) So the third option would seem to be the most plausible and exegetically supported response a Witness can make.

Be that as it may, it fails as an answer to our charge of contradiction. We argue that distinguishing personal and spiritual presence is nonsensical if the spirit is part of the Father. A person is personally present wherever he is either in whole or in part. If, therefore, the spirit is truly part of God, then God must be present where it is. That Witness theology also conceives of God as essentially embodied does not alter this fact. That the sort of omnipresence we argue that Witness theology has to affirm is at least possible for God is not a somatic presence is also besides the point. (In part, because orthodox Christians do not claim that God as such is embodied.) Whatever the words Witnesses would use to describe this non-somatic presence of God would not affect the argument either. They are still led to affirm that God is truly and genuinely present wherever his spirit is; this is the main point.

That this contradiction has long been overlooked within Witness theology, we believe, reflects poorly on the reliability of the doctrines espoused by Witness doctrinal leaders. Making what amounts to two (we believe, obviously) contradictory claims about God’s attributes does not inspire confidence in the theology espoused by Witness leaders. 

Their tacit admission that God is, in fact, omnipresent is not the same thing as the Christian affirmation of God’s omnipresence. In particular, Witnesses would not claim that God is wholly present in any location he is present. This is so for at least one reason. In Witness theology, God is more than his spirit. He also has a body, which is located somewhere to the exclusion of all other places. However, a Christian would maintain that God is both present everywhere and wholly present at any place he is at without being either contained in space or partitioned across space. So the Witness doctrine of the omnipresence of God would differ from its orthodox articulation in some important respects. Nevertheless, we believe that the similarity is sufficient that it at least severely weakens if not outright refutes their claim that a person cannot be omnipresent.[4]

Relatedly, to the extent that we have shown that even according to their own theology a person can be omnipresent, any supposed proof that Witness theology would draw from the Spirit’s ubiquity to his alleged lack of personhood also refuted. The Father is a person, yet he is omnipresent. This would hardly refute all of the objections that Witnesses make against the personhood of the Holy Spirit, but it is not nothing either.

Given how easy it is to demonstrate that Witness theology affirms God’s (at least potential) omnipresence, we are left wondering why they denied it in the first place. What exactly did the Bible Student or Witness religious leaders who opposed omnipresence, such as Charles Taze Russell, imagine the orthodox claim amounted to? Perhaps they severely misunderstood it to begin with. While the historical origins of the Witness opposition to omnipresence might be interesting to know, we feel that the most interesting thing is how it is part of a self-contradiction within Witness theology, that like self-contradictions generally, tends to weaken the system it is a part of.

[1] Some Witnesses with whom I’ve conversed deny that the Witness doctrine of God attributes spatial extension or somatic composition to God. However, there are numerous Bible Student and Jehovah’s Witness publications that teach that God is a spatially extended and somatically composite substance. A compilation of such quotations can be found in this blog post. And a defense of the claim that somatic composition and spatial extension is affirmed by Witness theology can be found in this essay.

[2] By “intrinsic” we do not mean that it is located wholly within his body, but that it is truly him, that is, part of him.

[3] So, even if a Witness were to dispute that the Spirit is really just God’s power considered under a particular description, we suspect that he would still agree that his theology holds that the spirit is truly part of God.

[4] We suspect that if Witness theology was revised to remove this contradiction (by conceding that God is truly omnipresent or capable of the same), Witnesses would likely modify one of their existing claims. They would assert that whether a person is omnipresent or not, he must have a body. But this equally tendentious claim is beyond the scope of this essay.

The Charge of Adoptionism Vindicated (Part Two)

Witness literature claims that God transferred the life pattern and life force of Michael from heaven to earth. We have already argued that the former part of this claim cannot explain how Jesus could be identical to Michael. Here we argue that the second part of this claim cannot explain this supposed identity either.[1] Why can this supposed transfer of life force not guarantee the personal identity of Michael in the incarnation? First, Witness literature may not even claim that Michael’s life force was literally transferred, if by transferred we mean a literal movement of one and the same instance of life force. Second, life force is ill-suited to explain personal identity. Third, at least with respect to the resurrected, it is not used to explain their personal identity.

Before proceeding we ought to justify why we speak of instances of a life force, terminology not found within Witness literature. While this exact expression is not found within Witness literature, the idea certainly is. As described in their publications the life force in every living creature is generically identical. The life force in a cat in no way differs from the life force that is in you. (Insight on the Scriptures, Vol. II, p. 1025; Is This Life All There Is?, p. 50) However, you have your own life force, and the cat has its own. Your life force was transmitted to you by your parents. It must be sustained by your eating, your drinking, and especially by your breathing. (Ibid., p. 246) Since Witness literature speaks of multiple beings possessing the same kind of thing, it makes sense to speak of instances of this thing, life force.

Ecclesiastes 12:7 says that at death “the spirit will return to God who gave it.” While this might be taken to indicate a literal movement of a man’s spirit (or life force) from earth to heaven, Witness literature is very clear that no literal movement of a person’s life force happens after the death of the body. What this passage means, according to their interpretation, is that the grant of existence that was previously enjoyed by the now dead man reverts to God, who has the power to give life back to the dead. There is no literal return, because a man’s life force did not previously exist in heaven, and it does not subsist after death. (Insight on the Scriptures, Vol. II, p. 1025) Their literature compares the spirit’s return to God to a financial transaction where certain immovable property is legally transferred from one party to another. (Is This Life All There Is?, p. 52) Just as one can speak of a transfer in such cases, where no literal movement takes place, one can speak of a spirit returning to God, even though no literal movement takes place.

 

Since Witness theology takes such apparently locomotory language figuratively, we suggest that their publications’ statements about Michael’s life force being transferred from heaven to earth might be understood along similar lines. In which case, the process would look something like the following. The instance of life force that existed in Michael’s angelic body ceased to exist when Michael’s body ceased to exist.[2] At the same time, a new human body was given a new instance of life force. If this is what is supposed to have happened, then possession of the self-same instance of life force is out of the question.

 

Further, life force is ill-suited to ground personal identity. As described by Witness literature it is impersonal and cannot bear any imprint of the person whose life force it was. (Insight on the Scriptures, Vol. II, p. 1025; Is This Life All There Is?, p. 50) So, it cannot store the life pattern, which Witness theology appears to describe as sufficient and necessary for personal identity. Of course, if the life pattern is both sufficient and necessary, it is hard to see why possession of the same instance of life force would even be invoked in the first place, except to explain why the creature, whatever its identity, exists or is alive. It certainly could not be sufficient to explain personal identity.

 

Let us suppose that a particular instance of life force could subsist between bodies or apart from any body. It is not clear why it could be useful to explain personal identity. Even if we were to grant that an instance of life force could both exist and therefore retain its own identity from one particular kind of body to a second body of a different kind, we would still have to ask the following question. Why would possession of it matter for personal identity? Something as bare and relatively property-less as an instance of life force would be an odd candidate for something that would play this role – especially when Witness theology already posits something else to fill this role! We believe that the Witness comparison of life force to electricity would illustrate this point. (Insight on the Scriptures, Vol. II, p. 1025) If you were able to take the exact same electricity from one electronic device to another, the second device would not therefore be identical to the first one. So why would possessing the same instance of the electricity-like life force make you the same person whose life force it was originally, especially when you do not possess the complete life pattern of this person?

 

That Witness literature never claims (and could not claim) that the resurrected will possess the same instance of life force that they had before they died shows that possession of the same instance of life force plays no role in grounding personal identity. Consequently, any attempt to explain how Jesus is identical to Michael from his conception by appealing to life force cannot even get off the ground. Keep in mind, also, that at best it would be a necessary factor for personal identity. As long as possession of the same life pattern is necessary, the mere possession of the same instance of life force could not be sufficient for personal identity. Of course, that the resurrected are supposedly the same persons who have died shows that Witness theology does not consider possession of the same instance of life force necessary.

For these three reasons, we believe that any attempt to explain how Jesus could be identical to Michael from his conception by appealing to his possession of the same instance of life force fails. First, it is not even clear that this is what Witness literature means to claim. Second, given how life force is described in Witness literature it seems ill-suited to ground personal identity. Third, its striking absence when discussing the problem of the personal identity of the resurrected indicates that in Witness theology life force plays no role in explaining personal identity. In other words, even if within Witness theology an instance of life force could be literally moved between bodies, which we think is unlikely given how their literature speaks of its connection to the body of the person it enlivens,[3] it would be neither sufficient nor necessary to personal identity.

In the following part of the essay we will examine whether or not we have misunderstood what Witness literature says about the life pattern and what counts as sufficient possession of a life pattern to be identical to the person whose life pattern it is.

[1] It is not clear that Witness literature even claims that the transmission of life force from heaven to earth is supposed to explain how Jesus could be identical to Michael. But because there are some statements that might be read this way, such as the following, and for the sake of thoroughness we will assume that this claim is made within Witness literature. The February 1, 1997 Watchtower says, "By performing a miracle that only God, the Creator, could have devised, he transferred the life-force and personality pattern of a heavenly son to the womb of a woman, Mary the daughter of Heli, of the tribe of Judah." (p. 11)

[2] Since Witness literature speaks of Michael having disappeared from heaven, (Holy Spirit – The Force Behind the Coming New Order!, p. 88) we suggest that part of the Witness account of the incarnation is that Michael’s angelic body ceased to exist; given the connection that is posited between life force and body, it stands to reason that Witness theology is at least implicitly committed to the claim that the instance of life force that enlivened Michael’s body ceased to exist during the incarnation.

[3] In particular, the claim that life force ceases to exist or is “extinguished” when a person (living body) dies. (Insight on the Scriptures, Vol. II, p. 246)

The Charge of Adoptionism Vindicated (Part One)

We have argued that the Witness view of personal identity leads to a kind of adoptionism when applied to their account of the incarnation. At best the man Jesus becomes Michael the only-begotten Son of God at some point in his earthly life, probably at the time of his baptism.[1] We have made this internal critique before and here restate it more fully.

By “personal identity” we mean the numerical sameness of a person over time. This is not a matter of degree. You are just as much you now that you will be in ten years or in the resurrection. What accounts for this fact within Witness theology? It is the “life pattern” (“life record,” “living pattern,” or “personality pattern”) that explains personal identity. It explains why you are the same person despite the material change that your body undergoes while you are alive. It also explains why those who have died will be the same persons when resurrected, whether or not they are raised up as human beings at all. 

While Witness publications claim that a man who is resurrected as human being will have the same genetic code and a body that is “reasonably like the” body he had before he died, these are evidently not absolutely necessary to personal identity within Witness theology, since the spiritual bodies of the anointed would not have human genes or resemble human bodies. (June 1, 1958 Watchtower, p. 328; Draw Close to Jehovah (2002), p. 242) Evidently, such things, while they might be necessary for storing a life pattern in a human being or helping others to recognize the resurrected, are not part of one’s life pattern.

How is a life pattern defined by Jehovah’s Witnesses? Observe how several Witness publications over the last 70 years have described it, some with more detail and others with less.[2]

“their traits and mental impressions that go to make up each individual” (February 15, 1954 Watchtower, p. 118)

“It is the life-long record of the creature, a record made by the thoughts he thought, the experiences he had, the knowledge he stored up. So the life pattern results from one’s memories and mental abilities. The life pattern includes all intellectual growth and characteristics that make up one’s personality.” (June 1, 1958 Watchtower, p. 328)

“God recreates the same person, with the same personality. . . . the same characteristics, the same distinctive qualities, the same memory, the same life pattern that the person had built up until the time of his death.” (June 1, 1959 Watchtower, p. 333)

“The exact impressions and memories of all things that happened during the person’s previous consciousness, his power of recognizing people and scenes and locations, and all his personality traits, and everything that displays his mental growth or retardation.” (April 15, 1963 Watchtower, pp. 241-243)

“The exact memories of all that person leaned [sic] and experienced during his former life . . . the same personality that he had at death” (March 1, 1969 Watchtower, p. 135)

“the same personality and memories as when he died.” (October 15, 1996 Watchtower, p. 6)

“their personality traits, their personal history, and all the details of their identity” (April 1, 1999 Watchtower, pp. 17-18)

“All our years of memories and experiences” (Draw Close to Jehovah, p. 242)

“The personality they had before they died.” (January 1, 2002 Watchtower, p. 7)

“His personality traits, his personal history, and all the details of his identity.” (March 15, 2006 Watchtower, p. 4)

“Your memories, attitude, and personality traits.” (August, 2020 Watchtower, p. 17)

From these and other descriptions we believe that it is accurate to define life pattern as a set of mental or psychological attributes consisting at least of one’s memories, knowledge, character traits, attitudes, and powers of recognition. In our opinion this amounts to a kind of psychological theory of personal identity, despite the claim by one Witness with whom we discussed this argument that Witness theology has “no such articulated systematic.” For this reason, we believe that the Witness theory of personal identity suffers from the same problems that other psychological theories of personal identity do. However, since our aim is to present an internal critique of the Witness account of personal identity, these will not be discussed at length here.[3]

Now, within Witness theology, prior to becoming the man Jesus, Michael had his own life pattern, which was shaped by his angelic nature and billions of years of existence in heaven. Therefore, he would have an unimaginably great reservoir of memories, unfathomably expansive knowledge, great wisdom, and the ability to recognize various other spirit creatures and locations within heaven. These would be key parts of his life pattern. Could his life pattern, which includes such attributes, be transferred to the newly conceived zygote in Mary’s womb?

According to Witness theology, yes. Their publications claim that God transferred the life pattern of Michael to the then newly formed embryo in Mary. The following statement is representative of what is claimed within Witness literature:

“Jesus had to have his life, with its distinctive personality traits, transferred to the womb of the virgin Mary.” (May 1, 1976 Watchtower, p. 263)

Such a claim raises the question of how this could be accomplished. In particular, what in this embryo could receive Michael’s life pattern? For if there was nothing that could, then the claim that Michael and Jesus are identical persons from the conception of the latter totally breaks down.

Where is the life pattern stored within a man? According to Witness literature, it appears to be stored within the entire body of a person. One publication speaks of the life pattern of a man being impressed upon every cell of a body at the time of his resurrection. Another states that it is stored, to some extent, in one’s blood. Other publications teach that it is stored especially in the brain. (May 1, 1954 Watchtower, pp. 280-281; September 22, 1955 Awake!, pp. 6-7; April 15, 1963 Watchtower, pp. 241-243; Is This Life All There Is? (1974), pp. 172-173) A zygote has neither a brain nor blood; the former begins to form about two weeks after conception and the latter begins to be produced as early as seven days after conception. So, if the Witness’ claim that Michael’s life pattern was transferred to the child within Mary’s womb at the time of Jesus’ conception, this life pattern must have been stored with what began as a single-celled organism. This naturally suggests that it was somehow encoded within Jesus’ genes. And this seems to be what the following Witness publication claims:

“It really should not be difficult to grasp that a transferal of life and personality traits could be and was accomplished invisibly by means of God’s spirit. In the case of humans, the cell that results from the uniting of the sperm and the egg is smaller than the period at the end of this sentence. Yet just a tiny fraction of that cell contains the complete code for producing a boy or a girl with distinctive physical features and personality makeup. Accordingly, no more than a microscopic particle would have been needed to make Mary pregnant with the perfect Son of God.” (May 1, 1976 Watchtower, p. 263; Italics mine.)

However, the suggestion that Michael’s life pattern was stored within Jesus’ genes is wholly unsatisfactory. For, while Witness literature either claims (or has to claim) that possessing a certain genetic code would suffice to make Jesus the same person as Michael, other publications undermine this claim. Though Witness literature claims that genes or inherited traits strongly predispose a man to acquire certain character traits, such predisposition is not the same thing as actual possession of particular psychological attributes, which comes to be over time and is influenced by other factors, such as (according to Witness literature) one’s environment, one’s own choices, and God’s influence. Merely to have “certain leanings” whether “from his birth” or from conception is not the same thing as a person actually having particular character traits, attitudes, memories, knowledge, and powers of perception. (May 1, 1954 Watchtower, pp. 280-281)

This same May 1, 1954 Watchtower article states the following with respect to a newborn, “The child when born possesses to some degree a life pattern. His brain has certain “circuits” already dimly formed.” (Italics mine.) Along the same lines the April 15, 1954 Watchtower states that a “baby that is still born or that dies shortly after birth” “may not have developed a life pattern or intelligent memory” for “even a year after birth.” (p. 255) While claiming that unborn children will not be resurrected,[4] that article stated that God could “reproduce all these latent tendencies” of a child who had died in infancy. The child’s personality would then develop or “unfold” as it was raised on what would then be a paradise earth. The August 1, 1960 Watchtower claimed that the newborn child of David and Bathsheba who died had not “developed any personality pattern or consciousness.”[5] If a human newborn at best only partially possesses a life pattern (mere “latent tendencies”) and consequently needs time to develop one fully, it is hard to see how Witness anthropology can account for Jesus supposedly having Michael’s complete life pattern from the time of his conception.

True, in speaking about the conception of Jesus, one Witness book, God’s “Eternal Purpose” Now Triumphing for Man’s Good, states, “In this case an absolutely new living creature without any previous experience or background was not brought into existence, as in the case of ordinary human conception by means of a human father.” (p. 137; Italics mine.) However, this does not amount to anything approaching an explanation as to how this can be the case, especially since physically at this point Jesus did not relevantly differ from other “new living creatures without any previous experience or background.” (That is, he had a human genetic code, human organelles, and the like.) It is only an assertion that the man Jesus was already the same person as Michael. But why Jesus should be regarded as having “previous experience or background” is left unaccounted for. And insofar as Witness publications concede that genetic predisposition to certain psychological qualities or mental abilities is not the same thing as actual possession of such traits or abilities, it is hard to see what they could use to account for this supposed identity. In other words, if human newborns can only possess a life pattern to some extent and have merely certain latent tendencies, it appears that Witness literature implicitly concedes the impossibility of Michael’s life pattern being stored within a zygote or an unborn child at any stage.

Further, as we noted previously, in Witness theology (as in the Bible), the man Jesus grew in wisdom. And it is claimed that Christ only received knowledge of “his prehuman existence and the things he had heard from his Father and the things he had seen his Father do, as well as the glory that he himself had enjoyed in the heavens” at his baptism. (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. II, p. 59) While the claim that such things were revealed to him at this particular time is sometimes made tentatively, what is definitely clear (according to Witness theology) is that it was some time long after his conception that such memories and knowledge were restored to him. And if one’s life pattern includes things such as memories, knowledge, and the ability to recognize persons and locations, then the question of whether anything within the preborn or newly born Jesus could have stored the life pattern of Michael is moot, since, according to several Witness publications, he did not even possess key aspects of Michael’s life pattern until long after his birth!

So, if the life pattern is the source of personal identity within Witness theology, it would appear that the incarnation is impossible. Witness literature makes statements that undermine any suggestion that a human zygote can fully possess its own relatively simple life pattern, let alone one as complex as Michael’s. And even if Witness literature could explain how Michael’s life pattern could be fully stored within the unborn Christ at any stage of his development, the whole issue is almost irrelevant, since it is also claimed that so much of what made up Michael’s life pattern was only given to Christ many years after his birth. For this reason (among others) we conclude that Witness theory of personal identity, namely, possession of one and the same life pattern, fails. Since this is probably the best explanation that Witness theology could propose given its dogmatic denial of dualism, we suggest that Witness theology should abandon the latter.

In the next part of this essay we will reexamine the question of whether possession of numerically one and the same instance of “life force” might be able to explain how Jesus could be identical to Michael. Afterward, we will examine two other suggestions related to “life pattern” and see if they offer Witness theology any way to escape our accusation that its account of personal identity leads to a kind of adoptionism when applied to the incarnation.

[1] We say “at best,” because the resulting merged life pattern (memories, knowledge, experience, etc.) is neither identical to that which Michael had before Jesus was conceived nor to what Jesus had immediately prior to the opening up of the heavens. Given what Witness literature says about the life pattern, it would seem that to be consistent Witness theology would have to say that a new person, who is neither Jesus nor Michael, is formed at this moment. However, for the rest of the essay we will concede for the sake of argument that at this point, at least, Jesus is Michael.

[2] A fuller compilation of relevant statements from Witness literature will be included as an addendum to this essay.

[3] We believe the following two external objections to the Witness account of personal identity to be the most decisive. First, since a life pattern is inherently duplicable, it cannot ground personal identity. Second, since psychological attributes, such as memory, knowledge, and powers of recognition, can change drastically over the course of one’s life, these cannot be the basis of personal identity; if they were, then personal identity would be a matter of degree. However, since personal identity is categorical, something more fundamental than these attributes must account for personal identity.

[4] Witness theology has abandoned this position in favor of a hopeful agnosticism.

[5] 12.18.2024 Compare also the following claim. “At birth the brain of the human babe is almost blank, only a few circuits being there, such as the instinct to suck and a few other basic patterns necessary for survival.” (June 1, 1953 Watchtower, p. 343)

A Prophet by Any Other Name

Email to William Kelly, Author of "Are Jehovah's Witnesses False Prophets?"

Below is the body of a message that I just sent to William Kelly, a Witness apologist, pertaining to his book written to defend Witness leaders against the charge that they are false prophets. I do not know if he will see it, since the most recent post on his blog, which is where the contact form was located, is already several years old. However, if I do not get a response I will attempt to find his email address (which may very well be readily available on his blog; I haven't checked) and ask him that way.

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I purchased and have read your book "Are Jehovah's Witnesses False Prophets". While I think you do a good job articulating a defense to the accusation that Witness leaders are false prophets, I think you overlook several arguments that support the charge that at least some Witness leaders have engaged in false prophecy. Consequently, I think your apologetic effort is at best incomplete and so does not really substantiate your negative answer to the titular question.

There are occasions, it seems to me, where Witness publications claim that some of their teachings, including the "present truth" chronology is "absolutely and unqualifiedly correct", or to present not their own or human interpretation, but God's own angelically-given or spirit-given interpretation of prophecy. Given the falsity of at least some of what is claimed, this seems to rise to the level of false prophecy.

Moreover, the implicit definition of false prophet used by Witness leaders to condemn "the clergy", when applied by Christian critics, seems to indicate that Witness leaders are false prophets. Since, what counts as false doctrine or bad fruit to such a critic differs from what it means to a Witness.

And the definition in "Reasoning From the Scriptures" seems applicable to Witness leaders. And I think that, when applied, it indicates that at least some of them have been false prophets.

Lastly, I think the related issue of credibility needs to be addressed. What good does it do to exonerate Witness leaders of the charge of being false prophets if the Witness organization's track record of prophetic interpretation is bad? I would argue that it is bad. And, if so, this fact would seems to discredit the claims to authority or organizational legitimacy made by such Witness leaders. And this is only slightly less problematic than would be the conclusion that they are false prophets.

If you are interested in discussing this or in providing feedback to an essay I am writing on this point, let me know. My email is tubertheologian@gmail.com

A Prophet by Any Other Name (Part Three)

     So far we have not offered our own definition of what a false prophet is. Now it would be appropriate to do so; doing so will furnish an additional argument that some Witness leaders are false prophets, one which is closely related to that which was just concluded. I think the definition provided in the Jehovah’s Witness book Reasoning From the Scriptures is a good definition. “Individuals and organizations proclaiming messages that they attribute to a superhuman source but that do not originate with the true God and are not in harmony with his revealed will.” (p. 132)

  Before using it, however, we need to clarify what is meant by “attribute”. Should we say that claiming that a certain passage in the Bible, X, means Y is to attribute something to God? If so and if what is claimed is false, is this to falsely attribute something to God? In a sense, perhaps. However, this by itself does not seem to make such an interpretation a false prophecy. Clearly, therefore, “attribute” must be meant in some sort of more robust sense. Consider another scenario. Suppose I claim that my biblical interpretation, Y, is God’s own interpretation of something in the Bible, X. Further, I claim that God revealed that X = Y to me through angels and/or the Holy Spirit because I am part of his sole channel of communication on earth and that otherwise no one, including myself, could have known it. (Incidentally, this interpretation bolsters my own authority as a religious leader whom you ought to, at least generally, believe and show deference to.) This sort of attribution seems to be the sort of thing that this definition of a false prophet means to include when it says that such a person “attribute[s a message] to a superhuman source”. In this scenario, the interpretation I teach is supposedly a revelation, not the product of my own conjecture. It purports to make what is, in fact, my own interpretation, come from God no less than did the original passage, to which it is supposedly equivalent in meaning.

  Importantly, claiming a specific mode of enlightenment or inspiration or infallibility is not part of the definition offered in this Witness publication. Admittedly, in the same chapter in which the above definition is given they write, “Jehovah’s Witnesses do not claim to be inspired prophets.” But they stop short of making such a claim part of their definition of a false prophet, presumably because they intend for this definition to cover a wide variety of cases, including those who may have little or no awareness of biblical prophets. And given that there are robust ways to attribute a message to a superhuman source without claiming to be inspired à la the biblical prophets or without claiming to be inerrant, it is reasonable to omit claiming either of these things from one’s definition of a false prophet. 

The definition offered by Witnesses in Reasoning From the Scriptures is sufficiently broad as to include both predictions and doctrine as well as those who attribute their message to God and those who attribute it to a false god. Yet it remains specific enough to exclude mere human conjecture that most people would not classify alongside ostensible prophetic utterances. It also fits well with the Biblical descriptions of false prophets.

Considering the evidence discussed above, I would suggest that at least some Witness leaders (e.g., those who claimed that they were not offering their own interpretations but God’s own, angelically or spirit-given interpretation) are false prophets by this Witness definition.