The Charge of Adoptionism Vindicated (Part Two)

Witness literature claims that God transferred the life pattern and life force of Michael from heaven to earth. We have already argued that the former part of this claim cannot explain how Jesus could be identical to Michael. Here we argue that the second part of this claim cannot explain this supposed identity either.[1] Why can this supposed transfer of life force not guarantee the personal identity of Michael in the incarnation? First, Witness literature may not even claim that Michael’s life force was literally transferred, if by transferred we mean a literal movement of one and the same instance of life force. Second, life force is ill-suited to explain personal identity. Third, at least with respect to the resurrected, it is not used to explain their personal identity.

Before proceeding we ought to justify why we speak of instances of a life force, terminology not found within Witness literature. While this exact expression is not found within Witness literature, the idea certainly is. As described in their publications the life force in every living creature is generically identical. The life force in a cat in no way differs from the life force that is in you. (Insight on the Scriptures, Vol. II, p. 1025; Is This Life All There Is?, p. 50) However, you have your own life force, and the cat has its own. Your life force was transmitted to you by your parents. It must be sustained by your eating, your drinking, and especially by your breathing. (Ibid., p. 246) Since Witness literature speaks of multiple beings possessing the same kind of thing, it makes sense to speak of instances of this thing, life force.

Ecclesiastes 12:7 says that at death “the spirit will return to God who gave it.” While this might be taken to indicate a literal movement of a man’s spirit (or life force) from earth to heaven, Witness literature is very clear that no literal movement of a person’s life force happens after the death of the body. What this passage means, according to their interpretation, is that the grant of existence that was previously enjoyed by the now dead man reverts to God, who has the power to give life back to the dead. There is no literal return, because a man’s life force did not previously exist in heaven, and it does not subsist after death. (Insight on the Scriptures, Vol. II, p. 1025) Their literature compares the spirit’s return to God to a financial transaction where certain immovable property is legally transferred from one party to another. (Is This Life All There Is?, p. 52) Just as one can speak of a transfer in such cases, where no literal movement takes place, one can speak of a spirit returning to God, even though no literal movement takes place.

 

Since Witness theology takes such apparently locomotory language figuratively, we suggest that their publications’ statements about Michael’s life force being transferred from heaven to earth might be understood along similar lines. In which case, the process would look something like the following. The instance of life force that existed in Michael’s angelic body ceased to exist when Michael’s body ceased to exist.[2] At the same time, a new human body was given a new instance of life force. If this is what is supposed to have happened, then possession of the self-same instance of life force is out of the question.

 

Further, life force is ill-suited to ground personal identity. As described by Witness literature it is impersonal and cannot bear any imprint of the person whose life force it was. (Insight on the Scriptures, Vol. II, p. 1025; Is This Life All There Is?, p. 50) So, it cannot store the life pattern, which Witness theology appears to describe as sufficient and necessary for personal identity. Of course, if the life pattern is both sufficient and necessary, it is hard to see why possession of the same instance of life force would even be invoked in the first place, except to explain why the creature, whatever its identity, exists or is alive. It certainly could not be sufficient to explain personal identity.

 

Let us suppose that a particular instance of life force could subsist between bodies or apart from any body. It is not clear why it could be useful to explain personal identity. Even if we were to grant that an instance of life force could both exist and therefore retain its own identity from one particular kind of body to a second body of a different kind, we would still have to ask the following question. Why would possession of it matter for personal identity? Something as bare and relatively property-less as an instance of life force would be an odd candidate for something that would play this role – especially when Witness theology already posits something else to fill this role! We believe that the Witness comparison of life force to electricity would illustrate this point. (Insight on the Scriptures, Vol. II, p. 1025) If you were able to take the exact same electricity from one electronic device to another, the second device would not therefore be identical to the first one. So why would possessing the same instance of the electricity-like life force make you the same person whose life force it was originally, especially when you do not possess the complete life pattern of this person?

 

That Witness literature never claims (and could not claim) that the resurrected will possess the same instance of life force that they had before they died shows that possession of the same instance of life force plays no role in grounding personal identity. Consequently, any attempt to explain how Jesus is identical to Michael from his conception by appealing to life force cannot even get off the ground. Keep in mind, also, that at best it would be a necessary factor for personal identity. As long as possession of the same life pattern is necessary, the mere possession of the same instance of life force could not be sufficient for personal identity. Of course, that the resurrected are supposedly the same persons who have died shows that Witness theology does not consider possession of the same instance of life force necessary.

For these three reasons, we believe that any attempt to explain how Jesus could be identical to Michael from his conception by appealing to his possession of the same instance of life force fails. First, it is not even clear that this is what Witness literature means to claim. Second, given how life force is described in Witness literature it seems ill-suited to ground personal identity. Third, its striking absence when discussing the problem of the personal identity of the resurrected indicates that in Witness theology life force plays no role in explaining personal identity. In other words, even if within Witness theology an instance of life force could be literally moved between bodies, which we think is unlikely given how their literature speaks of its connection to the body of the person it enlivens,[3] it would be neither sufficient nor necessary to personal identity.

In the following part of the essay we will examine whether or not we have misunderstood what Witness literature says about the life pattern and what counts as sufficient possession of a life pattern to be identical to the person whose life pattern it is.

[1] It is not clear that Witness literature even claims that the transmission of life force from heaven to earth is supposed to explain how Jesus could be identical to Michael. But because there are some statements that might be read this way, such as the following, and for the sake of thoroughness we will assume that this claim is made within Witness literature. The February 1, 1997 Watchtower says, "By performing a miracle that only God, the Creator, could have devised, he transferred the life-force and personality pattern of a heavenly son to the womb of a woman, Mary the daughter of Heli, of the tribe of Judah." (p. 11)

[2] Since Witness literature speaks of Michael having disappeared from heaven, (Holy Spirit – The Force Behind the Coming New Order!, p. 88) we suggest that part of the Witness account of the incarnation is that Michael’s angelic body ceased to exist; given the connection that is posited between life force and body, it stands to reason that Witness theology is at least implicitly committed to the claim that the instance of life force that enlivened Michael’s body ceased to exist during the incarnation.

[3] In particular, the claim that life force ceases to exist or is “extinguished” when a person (living body) dies. (Insight on the Scriptures, Vol. II, p. 246)

The Charge of Adoptionism Vindicated (Part One)

We have argued that the Witness view of personal identity leads to a kind of adoptionism when applied to their account of the incarnation. At best the man Jesus becomes Michael the only-begotten Son of God at some point in his earthly life, probably at the time of his baptism.[1] We have made this internal critique before and here restate it more fully.

By “personal identity” we mean the numerical sameness of a person over time. This is not a matter of degree. You are just as much you now that you will be in ten years or in the resurrection. What accounts for this fact within Witness theology? It is the “life pattern” (“life record,” “living pattern,” or “personality pattern”) that explains personal identity. It explains why you are the same person despite the material change that your body undergoes while you are alive. It also explains why those who have died will be the same persons when resurrected, whether or not they are raised up as human beings at all. 

While Witness publications claim that a man who is resurrected as human being will have the same genetic code and a body that is “reasonably like the” body he had before he died, these are evidently not absolutely necessary to personal identity within Witness theology, since the spiritual bodies of the anointed would not have human genes or resemble human bodies. (June 1, 1958 Watchtower, p. 328; Draw Close to Jehovah (2002), p. 242) Evidently, such things, while they might be necessary for storing a life pattern in a human being or helping others to recognize the resurrected, are not part of one’s life pattern.

How is a life pattern defined by Jehovah’s Witnesses? Observe how several Witness publications over the last 70 years have described it, some with more detail and others with less.[2]

“their traits and mental impressions that go to make up each individual” (February 15, 1954 Watchtower, p. 118)

“It is the life-long record of the creature, a record made by the thoughts he thought, the experiences he had, the knowledge he stored up. So the life pattern results from one’s memories and mental abilities. The life pattern includes all intellectual growth and characteristics that make up one’s personality.” (June 1, 1958 Watchtower, p. 328)

“God recreates the same person, with the same personality. . . . the same characteristics, the same distinctive qualities, the same memory, the same life pattern that the person had built up until the time of his death.” (June 1, 1959 Watchtower, p. 333)

“The exact impressions and memories of all things that happened during the person’s previous consciousness, his power of recognizing people and scenes and locations, and all his personality traits, and everything that displays his mental growth or retardation.” (April 15, 1963 Watchtower, pp. 241-243)

“The exact memories of all that person leaned [sic] and experienced during his former life . . . the same personality that he had at death” (March 1, 1969 Watchtower, p. 135)

“the same personality and memories as when he died.” (October 15, 1996 Watchtower, p. 6)

“their personality traits, their personal history, and all the details of their identity” (April 1, 1999 Watchtower, pp. 17-18)

“All our years of memories and experiences” (Draw Close to Jehovah, p. 242)

“The personality they had before they died.” (January 1, 2002 Watchtower, p. 7)

“His personality traits, his personal history, and all the details of his identity.” (March 15, 2006 Watchtower, p. 4)

“Your memories, attitude, and personality traits.” (August, 2020 Watchtower, p. 17)

From these and other descriptions we believe that it is accurate to define life pattern as a set of mental or psychological attributes consisting at least of one’s memories, knowledge, character traits, attitudes, and powers of recognition. In our opinion this amounts to a kind of psychological theory of personal identity, despite the claim by one Witness with whom we discussed this argument that Witness theology has “no such articulated systematic.” For this reason, we believe that the Witness theory of personal identity suffers from the same problems that other psychological theories of personal identity do. However, since our aim is to present an internal critique of the Witness account of personal identity, these will not be discussed at length here.[3]

Now, within Witness theology, prior to becoming the man Jesus, Michael had his own life pattern, which was shaped by his angelic nature and billions of years of existence in heaven. Therefore, he would have an unimaginably great reservoir of memories, unfathomably expansive knowledge, great wisdom, and the ability to recognize various other spirit creatures and locations within heaven. These would be key parts of his life pattern. Could his life pattern, which includes such attributes, be transferred to the newly conceived zygote in Mary’s womb?

According to Witness theology, yes. Their publications claim that God transferred the life pattern of Michael to the then newly formed embryo in Mary. The following statement is representative of what is claimed within Witness literature:

“Jesus had to have his life, with its distinctive personality traits, transferred to the womb of the virgin Mary.” (May 1, 1976 Watchtower, p. 263)

Such a claim raises the question of how this could be accomplished. In particular, what in this embryo could receive Michael’s life pattern? For if there was nothing that could, then the claim that Michael and Jesus are identical persons from the conception of the latter totally breaks down.

Where is the life pattern stored within a man? According to Witness literature, it appears to be stored within the entire body of a person. One publication speaks of the life pattern of a man being impressed upon every cell of a body at the time of his resurrection. Another states that it is stored, to some extent, in one’s blood. Other publications teach that it is stored especially in the brain. (May 1, 1954 Watchtower, pp. 280-281; September 22, 1955 Awake!, pp. 6-7; April 15, 1963 Watchtower, pp. 241-243; Is This Life All There Is? (1974), pp. 172-173) A zygote has neither a brain nor blood; the former begins to form about two weeks after conception and the latter begins to be produced as early as seven days after conception. So, if the Witness’ claim that Michael’s life pattern was transferred to the child within Mary’s womb at the time of Jesus’ conception, this life pattern must have been stored with what began as a single-celled organism. This naturally suggests that it was somehow encoded within Jesus’ genes. And this seems to be what the following Witness publication claims:

“It really should not be difficult to grasp that a transferal of life and personality traits could be and was accomplished invisibly by means of God’s spirit. In the case of humans, the cell that results from the uniting of the sperm and the egg is smaller than the period at the end of this sentence. Yet just a tiny fraction of that cell contains the complete code for producing a boy or a girl with distinctive physical features and personality makeup. Accordingly, no more than a microscopic particle would have been needed to make Mary pregnant with the perfect Son of God.” (May 1, 1976 Watchtower, p. 263; Italics mine.)

However, the suggestion that Michael’s life pattern was stored within Jesus’ genes is wholly unsatisfactory. For, while Witness literature either claims (or has to claim) that possessing a certain genetic code would suffice to make Jesus the same person as Michael, other publications undermine this claim. Though Witness literature claims that genes or inherited traits strongly predispose a man to acquire certain character traits, such predisposition is not the same thing as actual possession of particular psychological attributes, which comes to be over time and is influenced by other factors, such as (according to Witness literature) one’s environment, one’s own choices, and God’s influence. Merely to have “certain leanings” whether “from his birth” or from conception is not the same thing as a person actually having particular character traits, attitudes, memories, knowledge, and powers of perception. (May 1, 1954 Watchtower, pp. 280-281)

This same May 1, 1954 Watchtower article states the following with respect to a newborn, “The child when born possesses to some degree a life pattern. His brain has certain “circuits” already dimly formed.” (Italics mine.) Along the same lines the April 15, 1954 Watchtower states that a “baby that is still born or that dies shortly after birth” “may not have developed a life pattern or intelligent memory” for “even a year after birth.” (p. 255) While claiming that unborn children will not be resurrected,[4] that article stated that God could “reproduce all these latent tendencies” of a child who had died in infancy. The child’s personality would then develop or “unfold” as it was raised on what would then be a paradise earth. The August 1, 1960 Watchtower claimed that the newborn child of David and Bathsheba who died had not “developed any personality pattern or consciousness.”[5] If a human newborn at best only partially possesses a life pattern (mere “latent tendencies”) and consequently needs time to develop one fully, it is hard to see how Witness anthropology can account for Jesus supposedly having Michael’s complete life pattern from the time of his conception.

True, in speaking about the conception of Jesus, one Witness book, God’s “Eternal Purpose” Now Triumphing for Man’s Good, states, “In this case an absolutely new living creature without any previous experience or background was not brought into existence, as in the case of ordinary human conception by means of a human father.” (p. 137; Italics mine.) However, this does not amount to anything approaching an explanation as to how this can be the case, especially since physically at this point Jesus did not relevantly differ from other “new living creatures without any previous experience or background.” (That is, he had a human genetic code, human organelles, and the like.) It is only an assertion that the man Jesus was already the same person as Michael. But why Jesus should be regarded as having “previous experience or background” is left unaccounted for. And insofar as Witness publications concede that genetic predisposition to certain psychological qualities or mental abilities is not the same thing as actual possession of such traits or abilities, it is hard to see what they could use to account for this supposed identity. In other words, if human newborns can only possess a life pattern to some extent and have merely certain latent tendencies, it appears that Witness literature implicitly concedes the impossibility of Michael’s life pattern being stored within a zygote or an unborn child at any stage.

Further, as we noted previously, in Witness theology (as in the Bible), the man Jesus grew in wisdom. And it is claimed that Christ only received knowledge of “his prehuman existence and the things he had heard from his Father and the things he had seen his Father do, as well as the glory that he himself had enjoyed in the heavens” at his baptism. (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. II, p. 59) While the claim that such things were revealed to him at this particular time is sometimes made tentatively, what is definitely clear (according to Witness theology) is that it was some time long after his conception that such memories and knowledge were restored to him. And if one’s life pattern includes things such as memories, knowledge, and the ability to recognize persons and locations, then the question of whether anything within the preborn or newly born Jesus could have stored the life pattern of Michael is moot, since, according to several Witness publications, he did not even possess key aspects of Michael’s life pattern until long after his birth!

So, if the life pattern is the source of personal identity within Witness theology, it would appear that the incarnation is impossible. Witness literature makes statements that undermine any suggestion that a human zygote can fully possess its own relatively simple life pattern, let alone one as complex as Michael’s. And even if Witness literature could explain how Michael’s life pattern could be fully stored within the unborn Christ at any stage of his development, the whole issue is almost irrelevant, since it is also claimed that so much of what made up Michael’s life pattern was only given to Christ many years after his birth. For this reason (among others) we conclude that Witness theory of personal identity, namely, possession of one and the same life pattern, fails. Since this is probably the best explanation that Witness theology could propose given its dogmatic denial of dualism, we suggest that Witness theology should abandon the latter.

In the next part of this essay we will reexamine the question of whether possession of numerically one and the same instance of “life force” might be able to explain how Jesus could be identical to Michael. Afterward, we will examine two other suggestions related to “life pattern” and see if they offer Witness theology any way to escape our accusation that its account of personal identity leads to a kind of adoptionism when applied to the incarnation.

[1] We say “at best,” because the resulting merged life pattern (memories, knowledge, experience, etc.) is neither identical to that which Michael had before Jesus was conceived nor to what Jesus had immediately prior to the opening up of the heavens. Given what Witness literature says about the life pattern, it would seem that to be consistent Witness theology would have to say that a new person, who is neither Jesus nor Michael, is formed at this moment. However, for the rest of the essay we will concede for the sake of argument that at this point, at least, Jesus is Michael.

[2] A fuller compilation of relevant statements from Witness literature will be included as an addendum to this essay.

[3] We believe the following two external objections to the Witness account of personal identity to be the most decisive. First, since a life pattern is inherently duplicable, it cannot ground personal identity. Second, since psychological attributes, such as memory, knowledge, and powers of recognition, can change drastically over the course of one’s life, these cannot be the basis of personal identity; if they were, then personal identity would be a matter of degree. However, since personal identity is categorical, something more fundamental than these attributes must account for personal identity.

[4] Witness theology has abandoned this position in favor of a hopeful agnosticism.

[5] 12.18.2024 Compare also the following claim. “At birth the brain of the human babe is almost blank, only a few circuits being there, such as the instinct to suck and a few other basic patterns necessary for survival.” (June 1, 1953 Watchtower, p. 343)

A Prophet by Any Other Name