Sawing Off the Branch They're Sitting On: A Witness Objection to Exhaustive Foreknowledge

Jehovah’s Witnesses argue that if God possesses exhaustive foreknowledge he would be evil and a failure for his permission of the Fall. This position can be refuted head on, though it is not the purpose of this essay to present such a rebuttal. Rather, its aim is to demonstrate that in making this sort of argument Witnesses end up convicting God even as he is misunderstood in their own theology. Since Witnesses acknowledge that God is perfect, they ought to abandon their misguided criticism of the orthodox affirmation of exhaustive foreknowledge and meticulous providence. The argument of this essay succeeds because the Witness open theist view is sufficiently akin to the orthodox affirmation of exhaustive foreknowledge and meticulous providence. Therefore, many of the criticisms of the latter, including those made by Witnesses, are implicitly criticisms of the former.

While exhaustive foreknowledge is the target against which Witness polemics are directed, we will focus on one of the most important events that God foreknew, the Fall. Witnesses object that if God foreknew “Adam’s fall into sin . . . he would have become the author of sin when he made man, and God would be deliberately responsible for all human wickedness and suffering.” (April 15, 1998 Watchtower, pp. 7-8) Other publications make the same claim.[1] (E.g., Reasoning From the Scriptures, p. 142; June 1, 2006 Watchtower, p. 25) Another article in the January 1, 2011 Watchtower characterizes the orthodox view of the Fall as follows. “He [would have been] foolish . . . to embark on a bizarre venture, using his ability to know the outcome in advance and then staging a mere rerun of what he already knew.” (p. 13)

If Witnesses were run of the mill open theists, they might be left with a self-coherent (if otherwise defective) objection. However, since Witnesses believe that God has sometimes used his power of foreknowledge, they are at risk of finding themselves the targets of their own objection. A brief discussion of their view of the extent of God’s foreknowledge will reveal whether they do fall by their own polemical sword. Sometimes what God is said to know is general in nature. For instance, they claim that when it was originally predicted that one of the Twelve would betray Jesus, God did not specifically foreknow that Judas would be that one. (June 1, 1953 Watchtower, p. 339; July 15, 1984 Watchtower, p. 6) But that God has foreknown even rather specific things is also taught within Witness literature. The prophecies of Christ with respect to Peter and John’s deaths, for instance. (July 15, 1948 Watchtower, pp. 223) Josiah’s campaign against idolatry at Bethel. And Cyrus’ conquest of Babylon. (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. I, p. 856) Draw Close to Jehovah states that “the outcome of wars, the rise and fall of world powers, and even the specific battles strategies of military commanders” are among the things God foreknew. (pp. 177-178) Witnesses also believe that the foreordination of the Messiah is the preeminent example of God’s foreknowledge and providence in action. This includes the fact of his death, its manner, and time. (Ibid. pp. 858-859)

Let us focus on the sins against Christ that God foreknew and utilized. Since Witnesses claim that God foreknew and used these to bring about his own good purpose, how can they avoid the apparent implication of their own logic that God failed and must be culpable for these crimes?

Might a Witness take refuge in the fact that unlike the orthodox they do not claim that God foreknew all of the details of these crimes? As was noted above, in Witness theology God permitted his foreknowledge about Jesus’ betrayer to be somewhat vague. That it proved to be Judas was not yet known to God when these prophecies were first written. In those days, God only knew that he would be one of Jesus’ inner circle. They say the same thing with respect to the role of Pilate or Herod, also. “Without predestining the specific individuals to act against him when on earth, the prophecies did predict many of the events that occurred,” states one Watchtower article. (June 1, 1953 Watchtower, p. 339) Does this sort of (at least initial) vagueness to God’s foreknowledge absolve God of the charge of complicity in such crimes? 

No. The fundamental fact remains that even within Witness theology God still foreknew the sins themselves, even if his knowledge as to who would commit the sins only became more specific as time progressed. Moreover, even Witness literature concedes that such sins were “a vital part of the outworking of Jehovah’s purpose.” (October 1, 1974 Watchtower, p. 598) And, as even Witnesses would concede, God could have prevented any sins against Christ from taking place. They explicitly state that he was able to “thwart or even block any attacks or attempts upon the Messiah that did not conform to the manner or time prophesied.” (August 1, 1970 Watchtower, p. 476; Insight on the Scriptures Vol. I, p. 858) And the actual occurrence of the predicted crimes depended “in part upon God’s own exercise of power.” (Ibid.) And, they teach that such crimes would occur was inevitable, at least once God came to foreknew them. (Ibid., p. 852)

If God can infallibly foreknow certain sins and utilize them for his own good purpose while remaining neither evil nor a failure, why would this not hold with respect to the Fall? Or, if it would be immoral for God to foreknow the Fall how can he remain moral since he both foreknew and intended to utilize the sins against Christ? However the problem is articulated, we believe that Witness theology does not have a good solution to this difficulty. And while this by itself does not mean that the Witness view of the extent of God’s foreknowledge or providence is wrong, it does mean that one of their objections against the orthodox affirmation of its universal scope is untenable for a Witness to make. And this, we believe, is an important step in defending sound doctrine against its Witness critics.

[1] Interestingly, however, Russell, whose Bible Student movement gave rise to Jehovah’s Witnesses and some other groups, taught that God did foreknow the Fall. (Studies in the Scriptures Vol. I, p. 193)

An Argument That The Witness Doctrine of Foreknowledge is Contradictory

P1) “Whatever God foreknows must inevitably come to pass.” (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. I, p. 852)

P2) “Jehovah God foreknew and foretold the Messiah’s sufferings, the death he would undergo, and his subsequent resurrection.” (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. I, p. 858)

C) Therefore, Christ (faithful) death and (glorious) resurrection was ‘inevitable’.

P3) Christ was “still a free moral agent” who had “freedom of choice – either to be faithful or unfaithful.” (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. II, pp. 67-68)

C2) Therefore, (according to Witness theology) infallible foreknowledge does not negate free will.

P4) There is no good reason why this should only hold true with respect to merely a few persons, actions, or events.

C3) Therefore, Witness theology should concede that exhaustive foreknowledge does not obviate “freedom of choice.”

P5) Witness theology denies that exhaustive foreknowledge is compatible with "freedom of choice."

C4) Witness theology is contradictory.

12.19.2024: I think a Witness will argue that C2) should be qualified in the following manner: infallible foreknowledge does not necessarily negate free will. Likewise, I think that a Witness would deny P4), at least if these persons, actions, or events are foreknown by God via a certain method.

Omnipresence in Witness Theology: A Contradiction

The claim of this essay is that the Witness doctrine of God contains the following contradiction. While explicitly denying that God can be omnipresent, Witness literature implicitly concedes that he is or could be omnipresent by other claims that they make with respect to the holy spirit. Therefore, they undermine their own claim that for God to be personal he cannot be omnipresent but must rather be essentially bodily.[1] We believe the presence of this contradiction within the Witness doctrine of God has the following implications. First, it weakens the doctrinal authority of Witness leaders, who cannot even harmonize their account of God's attributes. Second, it undermines Witness opposition to the orthodox claim that God is omnipresent. Third, it weakens their opposition to the personhood of the Holy Spirit.

According to Witness theology, what is the holy spirit? Their literature describes the spirit as "an instrumentality rather than a separate and distinct person." (July 15, 1957 Watchtower, p. 432) Their literature teaches that it basically is God's power. For, while Witness theology distinguishes God's spirit from his power, we would suggest that no real distinction is actually made between them. Rather, God's spirit is merely his power considered under a particular description, namely, that of being used. Put another way, we believe that the distinction made within Witness literature is between the thing itself and the thing considered under a particular description.

Their theological dictionary, Insight on the Scriptures, states the following with respect to the holy spirit. "It is not Jehovah’s 'power,' for this English word more correctly translates other terms in the original languages." (Vol. I, p. 1020) Yet this same article claims that there is "an inherent connection between" God's power and his spirit. This connection is indicated in how this article defines the two terms. "Power," it says, "is basically the ability or capacity to act." Spirit, on the other hand, "more specifically describes energy projected and exerted." Or in the words of an older Witness publication the spirit is "not Jehovah's power residing within himself but his energy when projected out from himself." (July 15, 1957 Watchtower, pp. 432) In our opinion Witness theology calls it power when God does not use it and spirit when he uses it. We believe that this view is also supported by a more recent Witness periodical referring to the holy spirit as God's "power in action." (February 1, 2009 Watchtower, p. 5)

Since Witness theology holds that the spirit is basically God's power it is evident that Witness theology regards it as intrinsic to God's being.[2] Given that Witnesses affirm metaphysical composition in God, Witness theology should have no qualms with affirming that the spirit is literally a part of God.

While some of their analogies for the spirit, such as comparing it to the electricity that comes from a power plant, might suggest that they conceive of it as extrinsic to God – that is, not part of God but rather a created force – we believe that drawing this inference is to take these analogies too far. (February 15, 1981 Watchtower, p. 6) Besides the reason given above, two further considerations support the conclusion that within Witness theology the spirit is conceived of as part of God.[3] First, other analogies indicate this. For instance, one Witness publication compares the spirit to a father's loving hand. (February 1, 2009 Watchtower, p. 5) Second, certain absurdities follow from supposing that the spirit is extrinsic to God, that is, not a part of him. According to Watchtower literature, the spirit is how God creates, gives life, inspires prophets, judges and the like. Supposing that his spirit is a creature seems to amount to saying that God is dependent upon a creature to do these things, which is absurd. And if God would be dependent upon a creature to do these things, it would be inexplicable as to how he would interact with this said creature in the first place. For if he requires the mediation of a creature to create or interact with the created world, how could he interact with a creaturely holy spirit in the first place? Clearly, therefore, Witness theology both does and must regard the spirit as part of God or as intrinsic to his being.

And this is where the problem arises. Witnesses claim that God cannot be omnipresent since he is personal. (Millennial Dawn Vol. I, p. 200; The Bible Students Monthly (1915) Vol. VII, No. 5, p. 2; October 1, 1951 Watchtower, p. 607; February 15, 1981 Watchtower, p. 6; March 8, 2005 Awake!, pp. 20-21; Bible Questions Answered, No. 123) Why they make this false and tendentious assertion is besides the scope of this essay. That they make this claim is relevant, though. Because they implicitly contradict this claim by conceiving of the spirit as part of God. If the spirit is part of God, then God must be present wherever the spirit is present.

Where is the spirit present according to Witness theology? Everywhere, at least potentially so. And for the purpose of this essay claiming that the spirit is potentially ubiquitous is just as problematic for Witness theology as claiming that it is actually ubiquitous. For the claim that Witnesses make is not that God merely is not omnipresent but that God cannot be personal if he is omnipresent. Even if their theology only leads them to conclude that he merely can be omnipresent, this would still be a contradiction. The following quotations show that according to their literature, Witnesses believe that the spirit is at least capable of being omnipresent. “His holy spirit as an active force is pervading all the unseen heavens.” (Holy Spirit—The Force Behind the Coming New Order!, p. 32) "God's spirit can reach everywhere." (Insight on the Scriptures Vol. II, p. 1017?) "Jehovah's holy spirit – or power in action – can be extended from his fixed location to any place in the material universe." (p. 21)

Our argument is straightforward. Witness theology affirms that the holy spirit is part of God. His holy spirit is or can be omnipresent. Therefore, Witness theology implicitly affirms that God is or can be omnipresent. However, they explicitly deny that he can be; they claim that he could not be personal if he was omnipresent. So there is a contradiction within Witness theology.

How might a Witness defend against this claim? We believe that there are three ways. First, one might argue that the Spirit is not actually part of God. Second, one might deny that the Spirit is ever literally present anywhere. Third, one might claim that God can be present everywhere just not in person or bodily. We believe that our earlier arguments suffice for now to show that the first option is not a viable candidate for a response. The second does not fare any better. Their literature clearly speaks of the spirit pervading heaven, being able to reach anywhere within the physical world, interacting with creation and the like. The sort of language used and the sort of claims made about the holy spirit should lead a Witness to dismiss the idea that according to their theology the spirit is not truly present where it operates.

Therefore, we believe that the third option is the only possible way out. Though, this appearance is fleeting, too. This response does have the benefit of apparently being suggested by some statements within Witness literature. For instance, one publication claims that “heaven itself” is “where the ‘person of God’ is, where God himself dwells personally rather than dwelling there by spirit.” (December 1, 1972 Watchtower, p. 713) And the idea of a genuine spiritual (as opposed to personal) presence is affirmed in an article in Insight on the Scriptures. There it is claimed that certain biblical “accounts illustrate God’s power to ‘be present’ on earth in a spiritual (hence, invisible) way while He yet remains in heaven.” (Vol. II, p. 677) So the third option would seem to be the most plausible and exegetically supported response a Witness can make.

Be that as it may, it fails as an answer to our charge of contradiction. We argue that distinguishing personal and spiritual presence is nonsensical if the spirit is part of the Father. A person is personally present wherever he is either in whole or in part. If, therefore, the spirit is truly part of God, then God must be present where it is. That Witness theology also conceives of God as essentially embodied does not alter this fact. That the sort of omnipresence we argue that Witness theology has to affirm is at least possible for God is not a somatic presence is also besides the point. (In part, because orthodox Christians do not claim that God as such is embodied.) Whatever the words Witnesses would use to describe this non-somatic presence of God would not affect the argument either. They are still led to affirm that God is truly and genuinely present wherever his spirit is; this is the main point.

That this contradiction has long been overlooked within Witness theology, we believe, reflects poorly on the reliability of the doctrines espoused by Witness doctrinal leaders. Making what amounts to two (we believe, obviously) contradictory claims about God’s attributes does not inspire confidence in the theology espoused by Witness leaders. 

Their tacit admission that God is, in fact, omnipresent is not the same thing as the Christian affirmation of God’s omnipresence. In particular, Witnesses would not claim that God is wholly present in any location he is present. This is so for at least one reason. In Witness theology, God is more than his spirit. He also has a body, which is located somewhere to the exclusion of all other places. However, a Christian would maintain that God is both present everywhere and wholly present at any place he is at without being either contained in space or partitioned across space. So the Witness doctrine of the omnipresence of God would differ from its orthodox articulation in some important respects. Nevertheless, we believe that the similarity is sufficient that it at least severely weakens if not outright refutes their claim that a person cannot be omnipresent.[4]

Relatedly, to the extent that we have shown that even according to their own theology a person can be omnipresent, any supposed proof that Witness theology would draw from the Spirit’s ubiquity to his alleged lack of personhood also refuted. The Father is a person, yet he is omnipresent. This would hardly refute all of the objections that Witnesses make against the personhood of the Holy Spirit, but it is not nothing either.

Given how easy it is to demonstrate that Witness theology affirms God’s (at least potential) omnipresence, we are left wondering why they denied it in the first place. What exactly did the Bible Student or Witness religious leaders who opposed omnipresence, such as Charles Taze Russell, imagine the orthodox claim amounted to? Perhaps they severely misunderstood it to begin with. While the historical origins of the Witness opposition to omnipresence might be interesting to know, we feel that the most interesting thing is how it is part of a self-contradiction within Witness theology, that like self-contradictions generally, tends to weaken the system it is a part of.

[1] Some Witnesses with whom I’ve conversed deny that the Witness doctrine of God attributes spatial extension or somatic composition to God. However, there are numerous Bible Student and Jehovah’s Witness publications that teach that God is a spatially extended and somatically composite substance. A compilation of such quotations can be found in this blog post. And a defense of the claim that somatic composition and spatial extension is affirmed by Witness theology can be found in this essay.

[2] By “intrinsic” we do not mean that it is located wholly within his body, but that it is truly him, that is, part of him.

[3] So, even if a Witness were to dispute that the Spirit is really just God’s power considered under a particular description, we suspect that he would still agree that his theology holds that the spirit is truly part of God.

[4] We suspect that if Witness theology was revised to remove this contradiction (by conceding that God is truly omnipresent or capable of the same), Witnesses would likely modify one of their existing claims. They would assert that whether a person is omnipresent or not, he must have a body. But this equally tendentious claim is beyond the scope of this essay.